subjective probability


Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Legal, Financial, Encyclopedia.

sub·jec·tive prob·a·bil·i·ty

a fair statement of the odds that a rational, well-informed person would give or take for the outcome of an experiment. The experiment may be unique and not rationally understood (precluding both theoretically sound predication and empiric experience). The formulation is applicable to experiments that have been carried out but the outcome unknown. (For instance, a certain statement about the gender of the fetus early in pregnancy is established but perhaps not accessible until amniocentesis can be done.) Unlike personal probably, the subjective probability should be the same from all competent counselors in possession of the same evidence.
References in periodicals archive ?
The subjective probability of an accident is based on (1) information used by insurers, (2) other information available to insurers but not used, and (3) private information.
Specifically, it will be interesting to see whether expressions of complete unawareness about specific programs ("I have never heard of it"), tend to map into expressions of complete belief uncertainty or ambiguity (No idea about the chances) for the corresponding programs--rather than uncertainty characterized by a subjective probability distribution (e.g., Camerer and Weber 1992, Ellsberg 1961, and others); and whether expressions of awareness accompanied by limited knowledge (I have heard the name only), tend to map into expression of partial belief uncertainty or ambiguity (Unsure about the chances), and vice versa.
The primary aim of the present study was to compare delay discounting, probability discounting, and subjective probability of obtaining future rewards in three groups: cigarette smokers, e-cigarette users, and never smokers.
Although Zamir, Ritov, and Teichman found that subjects' subjective probability assessments did not mediate the differences found between the direct and inference conditions, we sought to reexamine their results when the amount of evidence in the two conditions was equalized, hence the information about evidence reliability cannot be interpreted differently in the two conditions.
Although strict Bayesians maintain that all uncertainty and ignorance can be represented with subjective probability, Wagner expresses some reservations about Bayesian learning despite its attractive features.
It is just not possible to talk about 'the experimental probability' or 'the subjective probability'.
Where subjective probability assessments are appropriate, the potential for heuristics to affect judgment does not mean we should seek some other assessment method.
Subjective probability theory allows us to speak of the likelihood of a single event.
Likewise, 10 estimates of subjective probability (5 for gains, 5 for losses) were derived from the Probability Experiment.
This is known as subjective probability because it changes depending on the current state of knowledge of the individual making the assessment.
This reinterpretation led de Finetti to formulate the principle of "reduction to exchangeability" in order to eliminate the "nebulous" "metaphysical" concepts of objective probability and independence (essential in the formulation of the law of large numbers and of the limit central theorem) precisely in favour of the subjective probability and exchangeability.

Full browser ?