second intention

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sec·ond in·ten·tion

(sek'ŏnd in-ten'shŭn)
Delayed closure of two granulating surfaces.
See also: first intention, third intention
Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing © Farlex 2012


(in-ten'chon) [L. intentio, purpose, aim]
1. A natural process of healing.
2. A goal or purpose.

first intention

See: healing by first intention

second intention

See: healing by second intention

third intention

See: healing by third intention
Medical Dictionary, © 2009 Farlex and Partners
References in periodicals archive ?
144-7); logic, on the other hand, is described as dealing with entia rationis or second intentions and a logical understanding of the categories consists in understanding ontological categories as subject to second intentions (p.
By contrast, Scotus attempts to buttress Aquinas's contention that second intentions are concepts of concepts by insisting that second intentions are not based on the quidditative being of things but upon their esse cognitum, their being understood, and the relations represented by second intentional concepts such as "genus" and "species" have their immediate foundation in the ways we understand things rather than the ways that things are (pp.
The term "animal" is significative because all second intentions depend upon first intentions for their intelligible content.
By way of contrast, second intentions exist as mutual (rational) relations between what is "known" and further logical attributions.
To fully appreciate Poinsot's insight on this point it is perhaps best to note how representative being differs in first and second intention. Unlike the impressed species, which can never be directly known, representative being can indeed become an object of the intellect through an act of reflection or in second intention.
In the proposition, "man is an animal," the subject is itself a species or intelligible type that is denominated known a second time (by the predicate "animal") and so subsumed under a more extensive logical attribute, namely, the genus.(37) Thus an object grasped through immediate experience (first intention) is denominated known by an intelligible content that can itself serve as subject in a higher-order scientific proposition (second intention).
Consequently it seems inevitable to conclude that both are entia rationis and "second intentions," though not of the same kind.
Giles granted that mathematical notions are second intentions, in the sense that our way of knowing mathematical entities in abstraction from sensible and qualitative matter depends on the mind and not on reality.
A "second intention" is a concept of something consequent upon that first knowledge.

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