Sections I-II concern some of the major for-mulations of the concept of property emergence and pointing out their weaknesses, before is provided an alternative account in section III.
After setting out my preferred account of property emergence and responding to some possible objections to it, Section IV will clarify the notion of emergence operative in the theory of human consciousness that the neurophysiologist R.W.
However, to take this as a sufficient condition for property emergence is to countenance the possibility of causally idle, i.e., epiphenomenal, emergents, which is undesirable in view of the purposes to which the notion of an emergent property is typically put.
It is vital to a satisfactory account of property emergence, that it incorporate all of these conditions.
This strong form of supervenience is wellsuited to an account of property emergence.(18) Contrary to van Cleve, however, there is no need to suggest that the form of necessity captured by the inner modal operator is weaker than that appropriate to nonemergent supervenients.
Employing the three component notions just canvassed, the following definition of property emergence seems in order:
It will suffice for present purposes that we understand the supervenience involved in property emergence to be one-way only.