But by procreating, the prospective parent creates legal relations for what was, in the past, one member of the class.
By procreating you determine and fix the future legal relations of members of the class.
Of course, procreating also determines the moral relations of members of the class.
By procreating we determine the initial full quantum of legal and moral relations for a member of a class of persons.
With these concepts of the broad right to procreate, the class of prospective children, and property in others in mind, as well as the premise that procreating allows prospective parents to create future relations for prospective children, we can assess whether under the broad right these children are treated as property.
Locke's model of the state of nature, in which natural liberty occurs primarily in the absence of others (or society), and Locke's analysis of the relations between parent and child, provide a special context in which to consider the act of procreating. Locke was concerned with how rights changed as humans proliferated throughout nature, coming into inevitable contact with one another.
(339) Nor does common experience of the reasons persons give for procreating always comport with the notion of an act of "great significance for personal identity," or a "serious" act in Griffin's sense.
In her dissent in Oakley, Justice Sykes opined that Oakley should not be required to show financial means to support his existing and future children before procreating again because lesser restrictions, such as jail time with work release for mandatory employment, were available.
If the intrinsic value of procreating is the self-fulfillment of the procreator (Skinner's "right to have offspring"), then we can presume this experiential value, this fulfillment, is achieved after the first birth- and merely replicated thereafter.
Finally, let us again assume that each act of procreating is serious, and now that it carries intrinsic value that is not capable of fulfillment, but may potentially be experienced ad infinitum.
Robertson points out that experiences associated with procreation after death would be an attenuated version of the experiences involved in procreating during one's lifetime.
As argued above, the interest in procreating after PVS is not as strong as the interest in procreating in the ordinary context.