Moreover, exercising a broad right to procreate today also bears an inverse relationship to its exercise in the future; that is, reading the right broadly now means that it must be read more narrowly in the future.
In theory, one can take all of the various rights that compete with an unfettered right to procreate, both now and in the future, and simply group them into any given society's collective interest in (and perhaps collective right to) an optimal upper population range-the upper range within which any given society with finite space and resources can successfully fulfill the obligation of optimizing the public good that it owes to its members, and that its legitimacy is contingent upon.
Indeed, assuming the intrinsic value of an unfettered right to procreate is less than the intrinsic value of the other rights it endangers or with which it conflicts, procreation should be the behavior primarily regulated to achieve the public good.
The right to truly be let alone, to enjoy natural liberty and engage in self-realization, competes with and limits the right to procreate. This is not to say that persons cannot achieve liberty in a populous society, but rather that all persons have the right to experience the special natural liberty outside of it if they choose.
The right to procreate, correctly defined, is a right at least to replace oneself, and at most to procreate up to a point that optimizes the public good.
To procreate is to act with substantial consequence for others, and such acts are subject to law, if only in its role as a guide.
669, 678 (1985) ("The Supreme Court has clearly guaranteed, at least for married persons, the fundamental right to procreate.").
tax system's incentives to procreate, in order to avoid catastrophic environmental results).
1992) ("[T]he right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."); Lauren Gilbert, Ann Shalleck & Claudio Grossman, Preface to the Conference on the International Protection of Reproductive Rights, 44 AM.
353, 368 (1991) (noting that "[t]he right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children....
REV 1156, 1297 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Developments in the Law] (discussing the fundamental right to procreate, which includes the right to prevent procreation and the right to terminate pregnancy); Note, The Problem of Coercion, supra note 7, at 1897 (noting that a compelling justification would be required to limit procreative rights).
Massie finds that "[a]lthough no case attempts to define a positive right to procreate as such, recognition of such a right is certainly implicit in Cleveland Board of Education v.