phenomenology

(redirected from phenomenologists)
Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Encyclopedia.

phenomenology

 [fĕ-nom″ĕ-nol´o-je]
the study of phenomena in their own right rather than inferring causes; in psychiatry, the theory that behavior is determined by the way the person perceives reality rather than by objective external reality.

phe·nom·e·nol·o·gy

(fĕ-nom'ĕ-nol'ŏ-jē),
1. The systematic description and classification of phenomena without attempt at explanation or interpretation.
See also: existential psychology.
2. The study of human experiences, irrespective of objective-subjective distinctions.
See also: existential psychology.
[phenomenon, + G. logos, study]

phenomenology

(fĕ-nŏm″ĕ-nŏl′ō-jē) [Gr. phainomenon, appearing, + logos, word, reason]
1. The study and classification of phenomena.
2. The science of the subjective processes by which phenomena are presented, with emphasis on mental processes and essential elements of experiences. A phenomenological study emphasizes a person's descriptions of and feelings about experienced events.

phenomenology (f·näˑ·m·näˑ·l·jē),

n a philosophical approach and method of qualitative research in which the essence of an experience is sought. The researcher identifies prior assumptions and beliefs and temporarily brackets them away from the experience being researched, so that it may be understood on its own terms.
Enlarge picture
Phenols.
References in periodicals archive ?
Perhaps I have misunderstood his point as it seems to me to be an odd one for a phenomenologist and ordained Zen monk to take.
Overgaard cautions phenomenologists against over-extending themselves in regard to their rejections of inferentialist accounts of social cognition (468); he nonetheless makes some important points regarding why we should call something perceptual rather than inferential.
In his recent essay "An Introduction to My Art Criticism" Fried says that Anthony Caro's sculptures made him feel that he was "about to levitate or burst into blossom" and that the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty "provided philosophical sanction for taking those feelings seriously.
The fact that "we" make this contribution suggests that we, the phenomenologists, take an active role in the development of consciousness.
Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are all existential phenomenologists, in that they deny the possibility of bracketing existence.
If the interpretations of phenomenologists are subjective, if we cannot replicate their analyses, and if there is no theory or logic to generate clear statements of what to expect, then why should we believe what they have to say?
If so, we could say that the complex of interactions comprises consciousness much as the phenomenologists do.
Phenomenologists, however, would more than likely question the ultimate usefulness of such an approach, maintaining that few street-level adherents of these religions would be familiar with the idea of polarities, and that fewer still would feel the need to analyze and resolve them.
Angilette makes a case that, in his writings, Gould reveals himself as a philosopher whose ideas can be located within a variety of traditions ranging from what she calls the formalism of Hanslick and the Marxist aesthetics of Theodore (sic) Adorno to the work of a variety of lesser-known phenomenologists and existentialists.
Perelberg concentrates on contrasting phenomenologists (those who consider there are only appearances) and objectivists (those who regard observed behaviour as the execution of principle or, for example, cultures).
This would lend credence to recent arguments of phenomenologists that understanding and meaning don't originate in language but are experienced first as bodily states.
Routinely, phenomenologists talk about the "experiencer," the "lived-experience," and the "sense-data.