paralogism

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par·a·lo·gi·a

, paralogism , paralogy (par'ă-lō'jē-ă, pă-ral'ŏ-jizm, -jē)
False reasoning, involving self-deception.
[G. paralogia, a fallacy, fr. para, beside, + logos, reason]

paralogism

(par?a-lo'jiz-em)
An incorrectly chosen word inserted into speech, esp. in patients with fluent aphasias.
See: neologism; paraphasia
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References in periodicals archive ?
The development of this negative or disciplinary function of the critical engagement with rational psychology relies on a distinction that Kant introduces only after addressing the four Paralogisms individually.
Such a Transcendental Paralytic underlies much of Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms.
Nonetheless this book can be studied profitably by advanced students of the Critique as a commentary on the central arguments of the Transcendental Analytic, along with the Paralogisms.
Kant's target in the Paralogisms is not the narrow rationalism of Leibniz or Descartes, but this Wolffian tradition of which Kant himself was a part: Kant has as his primary target the illusion that the T is originally given as an object of inner experience, mistaking the unity of inner experience with an inappropriately inferred substantial unity underlying that experience.
In the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason," Kant seeks to explain how rationalist philosophers, including thinkers of the caliber of Descartes and Leibniz, could have arrived at what he considers to be certain erroneous, "dogmatic" conclusions about the nature of the self or soul.
The Divorce of Reason and Experience: Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Context, COREY W.
As we know from the Critique of Pure Reason, in particular the Refutation of Idealism and the Paralogisms, he regards substance dualism as untenable.
It proceeds in two steps: The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology prove that we cannot make any legitimate causal judgments about merely temporal objects or events, while the Analogies of Experience prove that we can make legitimate causal judgments only about spatio-temporal substances.
My chief aim is to assess the extent to which Fichte was able to deal successfully with Kant's dualism of the cognitive powers without transgressing the cognitive boundaries specified in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, that is, without falling victim to the fallacies of rational psychology exposed by Kant in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
The reading is compatible with Kant's claim in the Paralogisms that we cannot know what the "I" consists in metaphysically.
The reader of the quotations from the lecture notes will be startled; it is as if one were reading the paralogisms positively signed.
As one would expect, Keller has extended discussions of the A and B deductions, the Analogies of Experience, the Paralogisms, and the Refutation of Idealism.