paralogism

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par·a·lo·gi·a

, paralogism , paralogy (par'ă-lō'jē-ă, pă-ral'ŏ-jizm, -jē)
False reasoning, involving self-deception.
[G. paralogia, a fallacy, fr. para, beside, + logos, reason]

paralogism

(par?a-lo'jiz-em)
An incorrectly chosen word inserted into speech, esp. in patients with fluent aphasias.
See: neologism; paraphasia
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References in periodicals archive ?
In the introductory remarks to the Paralogisms he explains more generally that 'It ['I'] is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve around in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made use of its representation' (Kant, CPR, A346/B404).
Such a Transcendental Paralytic underlies much of Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms. Insofar as the Paralogism exceeds reason by conflating two distinct senses of the name "I," the Critique deflates the "I" by paralyzing it.
Nonetheless this book can be studied profitably by advanced students of the Critique as a commentary on the central arguments of the Transcendental Analytic, along with the Paralogisms. In the case of each argument, Keller discusses the main interpretive and philosophical issues, and engages with the most influential interpretations, while articulating his own richly informed, sometimes controversial, but generally well-defended positions.
Kant's target in the Paralogisms is not the narrow rationalism of Leibniz or Descartes, but this Wolffian tradition of which Kant himself was a part: Kant has as his primary target the illusion that the T is originally given as an object of inner experience, mistaking the unity of inner experience with an inappropriately inferred substantial unity underlying that experience.
The Divorce of Reason and Experience: Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Context, COREY W.
As we know from the Critique of Pure Reason, in particular the Refutation of Idealism and the Paralogisms, he regards substance dualism as untenable.
It proceeds in two steps: The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology prove that we cannot make any legitimate causal judgments about merely temporal objects or events, while the Analogies of Experience prove that we can make legitimate causal judgments only about spatio-temporal substances.
My chief aim is to assess the extent to which Fichte was able to deal successfully with Kant's dualism of the cognitive powers without transgressing the cognitive boundaries specified in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, that is, without falling victim to the fallacies of rational psychology exposed by Kant in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
The reading is compatible with Kant's claim in the Paralogisms that we cannot know what the "I" consists in metaphysically.
The reader of the quotations from the lecture notes will be startled; it is as if one were reading the paralogisms positively signed.
For the first time we are provided with an English translation that supplies in their entirety both the first ("A") edition (1781) and the second ("B") edition (1787) versions not only of those sections that Kant rewrote completely for the 1787 edition: the preface, "Transcendental Deduction," and "Paralogisms of Pure Reason," but also of those sections that Kant revised "extensively although not completely" (p.
As one would expect, Keller has extended discussions of the A and B deductions, the Analogies of Experience, the Paralogisms, and the Refutation of Idealism.