paralogism


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par·a·lo·gi·a

, paralogism , paralogy (par'ă-lō'jē-ă, pă-ral'ŏ-jizm, -jē)
False reasoning, involving self-deception.
[G. paralogia, a fallacy, fr. para, beside, + logos, reason]

paralogism

(par?a-lo'jiz-em)
An incorrectly chosen word inserted into speech, esp. in patients with fluent aphasias.
See: neologism; paraphasia
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References in periodicals archive ?
The thinking in which nothing is thought can be none other than the 'I think' that "must be able to accompany all my representations" (B 131); but it is, as Kant shows in the chapter on the Paralogisms, absolutely empty and without content.
The Second Paralogism, which is 'no sophistical play', Kant admits, 'but an inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny' (Kant, CPR, A351), asserts 'that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject' (Kant, CPR, A352).
Kant's target in the Paralogisms is not the narrow rationalism of Leibniz or Descartes, but this Wolffian tradition of which Kant himself was a part: Kant has as his primary target the illusion that the T is originally given as an object of inner experience, mistaking the unity of inner experience with an inappropriately inferred substantial unity underlying that experience.
Moreover, in light of the sustained attention given to the challenge of idealism in the Fourth Paralogism and elsewhere, there is added reason to accept Kant's claim that the treatment in the second edition is necessary, unique, and original.
Contrary to the view of most interpreters, Caranti argues that the Fourth Paralogism is much superior to these later arguments.
The fourth chapter treats of personal identity over time, the subject of the third paralogism.
2) Thought disorders reflected by speech disorders of the verbigeration type, neologisms and paralogisms, verbal stereotypes, a.
Kant's opposition is puzzling, given the metaphysical agnosticism he advocates in the Paralogisms.
Ameriks, Karl (1982), Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
In a section of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Paralogisms of Reason, Kant proves the completely paradoxical nature of thought about reality (an inkling that, in fact, the problem isn't one of reality but of language itself).
Their transcendent use, that is, when we apply the categories to them in order to produce them as objects of knowledge, is only productive of paralogisms (soul) and antinomies (world); the only proper application of categories, of course, is in relation to the manifold of sensation.
He examines the idea that intelligence creates existence, an existence that is nothing in itself; as he does so he examines the reality of the thinking subject in terms of paralogisms and transcendental idealism including transcendental self-consciousness.