* Section 4.4 - 4.6, describe tests for evaluating the obfuscator tool (that I've used in the experiment) and identifying the obfuscation resistant features.
Obfuscation techniques mangle flow of the program, variable types, and class/method names, etc.
* Control flow obfuscation: Control Flow obfuscation significantly alters the normal flow of a program.
Against the backdrop of privacy's trust gap, we then offer both an internal and an external critique of Brunton and Nissenbaum's obfuscation theory.
In Part III, we offer a broader, external critique of obfuscation. We caution against leveraging the wisdom of obfuscation into a premature guerrilla war for our privacy.
We propose that a conceptual revolution based upon trust is a better path forward than one based on obfuscation. Drawing upon both our prior work and that of the growing community of scholars working at the intersection of privacy and trust, we offer a blueprint for trust in our digital society.
In addition, we introduce a parameter named RandomIndex (0 [less than or equal to] RandomIndex [less than or equal to] 1) to define the possibility of CHAOS performing obfuscation; that is, the closer the RandomIndex to 0, the higher the likelihood of CHAOS injecting fake information into the network.
Then, we implemented the obfuscation module in Floodlight, which obfuscates the unexpected flows and abnormal traffic judged by IDS.
We provide an implementation of obfuscation with Bros warning message.
The protection methods we used for the experimental evaluation can be divided into few groups: dongle only protection; dongle protection with code obfuscation; dongle protection with program (code) packing.
Additional code obfuscation was used for the .NET and Java implementations of protected program.
Since cracking of C++ program was done at the assembly level using debugger, we did not add additional obfuscation protection to this implementation of protected program.