The first refers to a "big" shock or macroshock that produces nearly simultaneous, large, adverse effects on most or all of the domestic economy or system.
Note that in this second definition, unlike in the first macroshock definition, only one bank need be exposed in direct causation to the initial shock.
Nevertheless, the bank's and depositors' responses to damaging government policies are likely to exacerbate risk taking, the fragility of the financial sector, and the magnitude and damage of the macroshock (Crockett 2000).
The moral-hazard and principal-agent problems that poorly priced deposit insurance creates, or at least exacerbates, suggest that the cost-benefit balance would be improved if insurance coverage were provided beyond small accounts at most only in the event of a macroshock. In all other failures, claimants on the bank would not be protected by the government de facto as well as de jure and in their own interest would have to exert market discipline on bank management at all times.
By far the most important contribution any government can make to preventing macroshocks and their effects is to avoid adopting monetary and fiscal policies that produce them or to introduce policies that moderate them.
If it is not feasible to limit the government safety net to macroshocks, however, it is feasible to restructure its operation to reduce the adverse side effects.
Rochet argues in favor of establishing independent and accountable banking supervisors, suggests a differential regulatory treatment of banks according to the costs and benefits of a potential bailout, and claims that independent banking authorities should make it clear from the start that certain banks with an excessive exposure to macroshocks
should be denied the access to emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank.