Although both determinant judgements and judgements of taste alike must be universally valid they derive their validity from different sources.
How can judgements of taste be made independently of objective concepts and yet be universally valid?
Kant holds that since judgements of taste are universally valid, then some aspect of them must be universally communicable.
In judgements of taste, Kant argues, what is universally communicable is the subject's mental state.
In the case of determinant judgements, the source of universality is obvious.
Such views assume that disfigurement (i.e., negative judgement
) is an intrinsic aspect of some facial differences, and that cultural factors interact with this initial disfigurement thereby adding to, or amplifying it.
(24) Note that even though Kant recognizes impure aesthetic judgements about natural objects in which objects are judged under a concept, e.g.
The crucial issue is not whether our normal aesthetic judgements about flowers, for example, are in conformity with Kant's view, or, indeed, whether we ever judge flowers as free beauties.
If appreciation is understood as consisting in, or at least as being informed by, correct or sound valuation, aesthetic appreciation is, or is permeated by, well-grounded aesthetic valuation, which implies that the basis of a well-founded theory of the aesthetic appreciation of nature will be a conception of what it is for a judgement to be aesthetic.
For Kant, an aesthetic judgement is a judgement whose `determining ground' cannot be other than `subjective', which means that its determining ground cannot be other than the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (CJ, [sections] 1).(1) What Kant has in mind by an aesthetic judgement is a judgement made about something on the basis of experiencing that thing.