inflation

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inflation

 [in-fla´shun]
distention or the act of distending, with air, gas, or fluid.

in·fla·tion

(in-flā'shŭn),
Distention by a fluid or gas.
[L. inflatio, fr. in-flo, pp. -flatus, to blow into, inflate]

inflation

/in·fla·tion/ (in-fla´shun) distention, or the act of distending, with air, gas, or fluid.

inflation

In the context of fat fetishism, the deliberate distension of the stomach with air or liquids to evoke arousal in a fat-admiring sexual partner.

in·fla·tion

(in-flā'shŭn)
Distention by a fluid or gas.
Synonym(s): vesiculation (2) .
[L. inflatio, fr. in-flo, pp. -flatus, to blow into, inflate]

in·fla·tion

(in-flā'shŭn)
Distention by a fluid or gas.
Synonym(s): vesiculation (2) .
[L. inflatio, fr. in-flo, pp. -flatus, to blow into, inflate]

inflation


carcass inflation
pumping of air under the skin of a carcass of sheep or cattle to facilitate skinning. Universally discouraged, mostly forbidden for meat for human consumption.
References in periodicals archive ?
An inflationist thinks that there are facts about a person's employment of her sentences by virtue of which it is one abstract language rather than another that she is speaking; such facts determine that Aristotle spoke in abstract Greek, and in the same way determine that we are speaking abstract English.
An inflationist can take such a discussion at face value; but as far as I can see, the only way for a deflationist to deal with this, even if he accepts a notion of "objective synonymy", is to appeal to context-sensitive and interest-relative standards of translation that do not reflect objective synonymy.
If indexicals raise any special difficulty for deflationism, it is that for indexicals it is less believable that we don't need a more inflationist notion of truth conditions.
Of course, it may be possible to argue that when we describe the standards of acceptable translation for indexicals in detail we will have to bring in machinery that is powerful enough to provide a reduction of the semantic notion of reference to non-semantic terms; if this is so, then the would-be deflationist is in fact turning himself into a reductionist inflationist.
The final objection that I will consider is that you need an inflationist view of truth conditions to make sense of how we learn from others.
That way, if full-fledged deflationism turns out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we have now of just where it is that inflationist assumptions about truth conditions are needed.