Again, an inflationist is apparently faced with the three options of finding such facts, or accepting it as simply a brute fact that our word stands for genuine identity, or accepting a surprising level of referential indeterminacy in our basic logical vocabulary.
Consider "rabbit": an inflationist presumably thinks that the set or property that my term "rabbit" stands for is determined from the facts about this word's conceptual role for me, together with its conceptual role for other members of my community, together with the facts about what my believing various "rabbit" sentences tends to be correlated with, together with the same sort of facts for other members of my community, and so on.
I'll return to these matters in later sections, but first I want to further explore the contrast between the deflationist and inflationist viewpoints.
Any view, no matter how inflationist, accepts the instances of (T) as material biconditionals.
An inflationist thinks that there are facts about a person's employment of her sentences by virtue of which it is one abstract language rather than another that she is speaking; such facts determine that Aristotle spoke in abstract Greek, and in the same way determine that we are speaking abstract English.
An inflationist can take such a discussion at face value; but as far as I can see, the only way for a deflationist to deal with this, even if he accepts a notion of "objective synonymy", is to appeal to context-sensitive and interest-relative standards of translation that do not reflect objective synonymy.
If indexicals raise any special difficulty for deflationism, it is that for indexicals it is less believable that we don't need a more inflationist notion of truth conditions.
Of course, it may be possible to argue that when we describe the standards of acceptable translation for indexicals in detail we will have to bring in machinery that is powerful enough to provide a reduction of the semantic notion of reference to non-semantic terms; if this is so, then the would-be deflationist is in fact turning himself into a reductionist inflationist.
The final objection that I will consider is that you need an inflationist view of truth conditions to make sense of how we learn from others.
That way, if full-fledged deflationism turns out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we have now of just where it is that inflationist assumptions about truth conditions are needed.
16)Methodological deflationism doesn't even preclude that we might in the end come to accept an unreduced inflationist relation S has the truth conditions that p: we might conceivably see the need for introducing non-physical relations as explanatory.