Kuznicki writes, "Pace some objectors--including some libertarians--deontological libertarianism need not and should not be impossibly strict." This claim could mean that deontologists
should forgive real-world institutions for being unable to respect rights 100 percent of the time.
Finally, while deontologists
and utilitarians alike think that all moral problems are, in principle, resolvable, for many philosophers, such as Lyotard (1989) and Hampshire (1987), morality is essentially conflictual.
An effective response, however, would have to defend an alternate account of virtue that competes with the relational account, in the same way that efficient breach theorists have defended an alternate account of consent that competes with the account offered by the deontologists
In The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, James insisted that individual conceptions of the good are in fact ultimate, that is, not subject to revision or external theoretical criticism (as, for example, Utilitarians or Kantian deontologists
believe that certain acts are categorically wrong irrespective of their consequences.
Would not the use of terms familiar to students of European and North American ethics produce "biased" or distorted accounts of groups far removed from debates between deontologists
and utilitarians, or between advocates of natural law and divine command theories of ethics?
He asks how rational deontologists
can explain the coincidence between our alarm-like emotional reactions and their ethical views.
, in contrast, claim that decisions should be made using abiding ethical principles (e.g., nonmaleficence, honesty) that ought to be followed regardless of predicted outcome of the decision.
may confront their unique brand of moral "face-offs" in circumstances in which moral obligations practically conflict.
Two, even professional deontologists
do not agree about the concrete contents of deontology in general and of business deontology in particular.
further believe that in at least some circumstances it is more important to respect these obligations than to maximise overall good.
(134) If I happen to be against torture for deontological reasons, the additional knowledge that consequentialists are also against torture does not increase the strength of my moral conviction on the basis that any view that survived the process of deontologists
' and consequentialists' biases "canceling each other out" is somehow "more objective" and "free from bias." That is like saying that a Newtonian physicist's belief in some feature about the universe is strengthened by the additional knowledge that an Aristotelian physicist happens to believe in it too.