Deflation

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The rupture of a breast implant, which is abrupt, obvious and harmless with saline, and slower, less obvious and fibrosing (scarring) with silicone
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Second, and more importantly, in playing the derivation game, deflationists must heed the difference between an explanation of a fact, and a sound argument with that fact as a conclusion.
So, one important kind of disagreement between deflationists and inflationists about truth will be over the status of the assumptions used in deflationary derivations of problematic generalizations about truth.
Although Patterson rejects this label, many will read Law and Truth as advocating a warranted-assertibility theory of legal truth and therefore as being a justificatory account as well as a deflationist account.
Nonetheless, whether interpreted as a warranted-assertibility theory of truth, or a deflationist, appraisal account rooted in a linguistic ability or technique to endorse legal propositions as justified by the forms of argument, the justificatory aspect of Patterson's view is, at least initially, plausible.
In "Weak Deflationism" (1997) I defend a deflationist account of truth for propositions and an inflationist correspondence account of truth for other truth-bearers.
So by invoking propositional forms, deflationists can identify and even formulate theories of truth.
There is a deflationist position on what truth is: the notion is exhausted by a given, specified, mass of "platitudes", each to the effect that if words said (say) things to be thus, things must be that way.
On the negative side, according to David, deflationists typically think that attempts to cash out the idea of correspondence to reality invariably introduce all kinds of strange entities--states of affairs etc.
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality.
I have been arguing that inflationists as well as deflationists need some use-independent notion of truth as a device of infinite conjunction and disjunction, and that such a notion is needed only for sentences that one understands.
There is currently debate between deflationists and antideflationists about the ontology of persisting objects.
The author argues that both parties have difficulties: deflationists lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a nondeflationary account of truth.