's focus on bank credit deflation is misplaced because of a basic misunderstanding of how credit affects prices.
Second, and more importantly, in playing the derivation game, deflationists
must heed the difference between an explanation of a fact, and a sound argument with that fact as a conclusion.
Although Patterson rejects this label, many will read Law and Truth as advocating a warranted-assertibility theory of legal truth and therefore as being a justificatory account as well as a deflationist
account.(62) At first sight, this may seem inconsistent, since a nonsubstantive deflationism appears to be married to a substantive warranted-assertibility account.
In "Weak Deflationism" (1997) I defend a deflationist
account of truth for propositions and an inflationist correspondence account of truth for other truth-bearers.
So by invoking propositional forms, deflationists
can identify and even formulate theories of truth.
That means, I will argue, that these requirements for truth cannot be captured in the form "If words expressed the proposition P, then they are true only where the condition for the truth of P is satisfied." A given proposition is true just where the world is thus and so (or so the deflationist
picture asks us to suppose).
But as he well knows, this objection" is unlikely to worry deflationists
, who mean to take a deflationary attitude with respect to any need for primitive semantic concepts.
about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality.
I have been arguing that inflationists as well as deflationists
need some use-independent notion of truth as a device of infinite conjunction and disjunction, and that such a notion is needed only for sentences that one understands.
There is currently debate between deflationists
and antideflationists about the ontology of persisting objects.
"Indeed the intractable nature of semantic disputes [between localists and holists, between truth conditionalists and verificationists, between deflationists
and substantivists, as well as between others] ...