The truth of Exclusion is easily obscured, for the following reason: often, when an agent cares about some end, her concern will be manifested in intentions with respect to that end, and these intentions will themselves give rise to deliberative boundaries, evident in corresponding dispositions to exclude courses of action which lie beyond these boundaries.
Suppose, to revert to the example, that I had no disposition, however defeasible, to exclude from my deliberation courses of action which aided in the destruction of Tibetan culture.
The two-level theorist I am envisaging is partly right: in virtue of my concern with the continuance of Tibetan culture, and the associated disposition to exclude courses of action which are incompatible with its continuance, it is legitimate to ascribe to me the aim of not aiding in the destruction of Tibetan culture.
We can make sense of the idea that I have negative ends associated with each of these concerns: I aim not to "act against" either one of these ends, and so am disposed to exclude from my deliberation courses of action which would be incompatible with either of them, as Exclusion claims.
It would be unsatisfying simply to assert as a brute, conceptual fact about concerns that they involve dispositions to exclude certain courses of action from deliberation.
Granting that an agent has a pro tanto reason not to take a course of action incompatible with an end she cares about (and that it is not unreasonable of her to care about), why is it not an adequate deliberative response to this pro tanto reason for the agent simply to attach a quantum of disvalue to courses of action incompatible with that end, proportional to the strength of the reason she has not to take it--to be weighed in deliberation against the positive value of those courses of action, so that the net value of those courses of action may be compared to the net value of the other courses of action open to her?
5 each for courses of action 1 and 2, It is important to use this method so that all criteria carry the same proportion of scoring in relation to the entire analysis.
As the number of courses of actions increases and they are compared using more evaluation criteria, the decision process becomes even more useful in massaging multiple pieces of data into a manageable and understandable form.
The criterion of choice in originative decisions is direct preference for one set of consequences in comparison with the consequences of other courses of action.
On the other hand, in an originative decision, courses of action are compared with each other, so there must always be at least two courses.
Two courses of action are proposed and some consequences of these courses are noted.
If we never made decisions in the originative pattern, it would be difficult to explain how we're able to decide among courses of action that involve consequences not previously contemplated and not covered by the goals we've selected earlier.