closure principle

clo·sure prin·ci·ple

in psychology, the principle that when one views fragmentary stimuli forming a nearly complete figure (for example, an incomplete rectangle) one tends to ignore the missing parts and perceive the figure as whole. See: gestalt.

clo·sure prin·ci·ple

(klō'zhŭr prin'si-pĕl)
psychology The principle that when one views fragmentary stimuli forming a nearly complete figure (e.g., an incomplete rectangle) one tends to ignore the missing parts and perceive the figure as whole.
See: gestalt
References in periodicals archive ?
It rests on a misunderstanding regarding the causal closure principle. Tse understands the principle to claim that physical causes are sufficient for the occurrence of physical effects.
Nozick holds that failure of the Closure Principle is an advantage of the tracking account: skeptical arguments depend essentially on the correctness of the Closure Principle.
However, my main objection is this: If Moes accepts (b) above, then his NRP model violates the causal closure principle, according to which all physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
This is typically referred to as a closure principle, and it is one of the most important design principles (although SQL does not fully follow it).
He criticizes two features of Stewart Cohen's presentation (2002, 2005), namely, his focus on knowing that one's faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority.
When we keep this feature of the closure principle in mind, we can see, I think, that closure poses problems for naturalistic mysterianism that are of essentially the same sort as the ones that it poses for dualism.
In the first chapter, Koethe describes what he calls the transmission principle--often referred to as the closure principle. The principle states 'that if one knows that p, then one also knows to be true those propositions one knows to be consequences of p' (12).
Kim contends, however, that embracing causal overdetermination in the mental case should be resisted for at least three reasons: (1) it is implausible, (2) it makes mental properties causally dispensable, and (3) it violates the Causal Closure Principle. Each of these reasons can be defeated Moreover, further reflection on (3), according to Kim's implicit logic, may lend support to the claim that physical properties, and not mental properties are in danger of losing their causal relevance.
This essay argues that, insofar as these attempts are successful, they actually establish a far stronger closure principle. Worryingly, the acceptance of this stronger principle presents a new problem for the most popular form of physicalism, that of nonreductive physicalism.
This problem is a result of the theory's interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified.
According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. This paper argues that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit.
133): "Closure is the principle that one knows, or at least one is automatically positioned to know [...], all the known logical consequences of things one knows." But we won't be concerned with weaker and more vague being-positioned-to-know closure principles or stronger and false closure of knowledge under entailment principles.