closure principle

clo·sure prin·ci·ple

in psychology, the principle that when one views fragmentary stimuli forming a nearly complete figure (for example, an incomplete rectangle) one tends to ignore the missing parts and perceive the figure as whole. See: gestalt.

clo·sure prin·ci·ple

(klō'zhŭr prin'si-pĕl)
psychology The principle that when one views fragmentary stimuli forming a nearly complete figure (e.g., an incomplete rectangle) one tends to ignore the missing parts and perceive the figure as whole.
See: gestalt
References in periodicals archive ?
Tse therefore concludes that the closure principle is false for indeterministic systems, so it is no obstacle to mental causation.
Nozick holds that failure of the Closure Principle is an advantage of the tracking account: skeptical arguments depend essentially on the correctness of the Closure Principle.
However, my main objection is this: If Moes accepts (b) above, then his NRP model violates the causal closure principle, according to which all physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
The sceptic is construed as arguing from the premises 'you do not know that you are not a brain-in-a-vat' and 'if you are sitting in a chair, you are not a brain-in-a-vat', to the conclusion 'you do not know that you are sitting in a chair', and thus appealing to a closure principle, in contrapositive form.
This is typically referred to as a closure principle, and it is one of the most important design principles (although SQL does not fully follow it).
When we keep this feature of the closure principle in mind, we can see, I think, that closure poses problems for naturalistic mysterianism that are of essentially the same sort as the ones that it poses for dualism.
Kim contends, however, that embracing causal overdetermination in the mental case should be resisted for at least three reasons: (1) it is implausible, (2) it makes mental properties causally dispensable, and (3) it violates the Causal Closure Principle.
This essay argues that, insofar as these attempts are successful, they actually establish a far stronger closure principle.
In the first chapter, Koethe describes what he calls the transmission principle--often referred to as the closure principle.
This paper argues that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge.
The author argues that all forms of naturalism--even so-called liberal naturalism, a nonscientific version--suffer from presupposed and unargued-for closure principles that limit the scope of reality.
But we won't be concerned with weaker and more vague being-positioned-to-know closure principles or stronger and false closure of knowledge under entailment principles.