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the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause," but warned
Indeed, the Court remarked, "all three judges of the Court of Military Review implied that as reasonable persons they might have decided this challenge for cause differently under the same facts and circumstances which faced the trial judge.
6) The trial court acted within its discretion in denying a challenge for cause concerning a juror who initially indicated that she would be biased in favor of a police officer's credibility because of the juror's employment with the Drug Enforcement Agency because, upon further questioning, she unequivocally stated that she would not give a police officer's testimony more weight due to his/her status as a law enforcement officer and that she would evaluate the case on the evidence presented.
52) Although the Court acknowledged that the trial judge had put the defendants in a difficult position by erroneously denying their challenge for cause, the Court reasoned that the defendants had a choice at that point of whether or not to remove the biased juror peremptorily.
An erroneous ruling by the court denying a challenge for cause by the defendant does not constitute reversible error unless the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges at the time or, if he has not, he peremptorily challenges such prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the selection of the jury is complete.
Fulton, a 1996 CAAF case also authored by Chief Judge Cox, the court upheld the military judge's decision to deny a challenge for cause against member who was "Chief of Security Police Operations for Pacific Air Forces.
117) Most importantly, however, the fact that the improper application of the liberal grant mandate to a challenge for cause would trigger a separate, even less deferential, standard of review than the one used for implied bias challenges completed the liberal grant mandate's transformation into a rule of law.
Thus, prosecutorial peremptory challenges on occasion must be justified, but by less of a reason than would satisfy a challenge for cause.
And then the court attempted to weave its rule into the fabric of a trial, somewhere between challenge for cause and peremptory challenge.
In order to avoid this dilemma as well as the issue, the court seems to imply that when confronted with any defense challenge for cause, the military judge must recognize and apply the liberal grant mandate, even in absence of a specific implied bias challenge by the trial defense counsel.
In Leonard, a contested rape case, the military judge denied defense's challenge for cause against two panel members: Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) D, whose own daughter had been raped five years earlier; and Captain (CPT) P, who frequently interacted with the alleged rape victim.
An increased burden is placed on the government to articulate specific defined grounds for any desired challenge for cause because the military judge is now prohibited from liberally granting the government's requested challenge.