(28) Since noncognitive appetition
orders the subject to a good that is perfective of it, this criticism that Geiger makes of Rousselot provides an early indication that Geiger does not understand the object of the will, which he calls the "good as such," to be identical with that which is "perfective of the subject." When Geiger addresses the nature of intellectual appetite, he explains that by virtue of intellectual apprehension we are able to understand the "different modalities of the good," and to distinguish and identify the "particular reason for the attraction that emanates from a being." (29) We can grasp that some beings to which we are attracted we call good because they afford us pleasure or utility (that is, perfection or what is conducive to it).
. It is emotional purpose; it is agency....
Rhetoric "creates an informed appetition
for the good" (90) and its "function is an art of embodying an order of desire." (91) Language shapes man's understanding of reality and to adopt his language--its patterns, its pertinences, resonances, and assumptions with regard to valid and compelling reasoning--is to enter his world and dwell there.
Purpose involves a distinction between what is and what might be and an appetition
for some form of what might be.
The standards of reasonableness that philosophy can articulate from the critique of lived experience, or by reflection upon the claims that each value makes upon thought, feeling and appetition
, will be a distillation from practical knowledge, knowledge not exhausted by the verbalized generalizations or precepts of either agent or theorist.
Although a thorough account of Leibniz's philosophy of mind would have to include a discussion of appetition
, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Over and over, one finds words that make no sense in English and thus unnecessarily confuse the attentive reader: "logicists," 43; "appetition
," 97 and 98; "implicates" (with sense of "implies") 201 and 213; and "militates towards," 201.
A woman's choices thus manifest what Aristotle calls intelligent appetition
, orexis dianoetike, as distinguished from appetitive intelligence (1139b4-5).
Now a monad is defined by Leibniz as a simple substance that remains self-identical through time; it has an infinite series of states or perceptions, and a primitive force or appetition
which takes each of these states into the next in the series; that is, at every moment it has not only a well-defined state, but a state of change, what Leibniz calls a 'monadic conatus'.
For from this it follows, first, that human beings think themselves to be free in so far as they are conscious of their volitions and of their appetite, and do not even dream of the causes by which they are led to appetition
and to will, since they are ignorant of them.