moral treatment

(redirected from Moral therapy)

mor·al treat·ment

a type of milieu therapy used in the 19th century, emphasizing religious doctrine and benevolent guidance in activities of daily living; as such it was a form of psychotherapy as opposed to somatic treatments such as bloodletting and purging.

moral treatment

A therapeutic and preventive philosophy for managing mental disorders, which was popular in the early 19th century, based on William Tuke’s retreat model. Treatment consisted of removing the afflicted from their homes and placing them in a surrogate “family” of 250 members or less, often under the guidance of a physician. It emphasised religious morals, benevolence and "clean living", in contrast to the somatic therapies of the day (such as bloodletting or purging). Physical restraints were removed from the patients, they were accorded humane and kindly care, and were required to perform useful tasks in the hospital.

moral treatment

An approach to treating mental illness in the 19th century influenced by humanistic philosophy and a belief that a rational, caring approach would enable patients to normalize their thoughts and actions.
References in periodicals archive ?
From the pedagogical perspective, this demand (28) for a critical examination of impressions--which I shall refer to as DC--is not merely a demand for a Socratic self-examination (if it were just that, it could hardly be singled out as one of Epictetus innovations): although a process of examination of the set of beliefs we hold is, as we shall see, an integral part of Epictetus' moral therapy (29), DC requires more than that.
If so, we must either acknowledge the presence of a serious problem between Epictetus' psychology of action and his moral therapy or put DC into question.
To exhort me to adopt those practices, and to make of that exhortation a central element of the pedagogical enterprise of moral and epistemic improvement either points to the presence of non-cognitive elements in the sequence of human action, or to a deep conflict between Epictetus' psychology and his moral therapy.
The relevance of this second aspect of Epictetus' moral therapy is decisive: Epictetus knows that the act of examining an impression cannot possibly consist of a logical confrontation against the totality of our beliefs and opinions, but rather that the beliefs, the ideas against which the confrontation can take place, are merely a subset of that totality, which is why it becomes all the more pressing to make sure that the correct (and relevant) beliefs be at hand when it is time to deal with any given impression (66):
Therefore, this aspect of Epictetus' reflections can be safely considered as one of the elements of a systematic project of moral therapy that, at least in this specific respect, does not show signs of inconsistency.
First, I have tried to defend a partial aspect of Epictetus' moral therapy (his techniques of repetition) from the charge of conflicting with his intellectualist approach to human action.
Ziff, a scholar of psychiatric history, explores the history of the asylum in the context of the asylum and the moral therapy movements of the 19th century.
The asylum as a workplace changed significantly with the introduction of moral therapy and as a consequence work practices of attendants become primarily a caring rather than a custodial role.
What he needs to provide, however, is a kind of moral therapy by which we can adjudicate them.
With the decline of moral therapy in the second half of the nineteenth century and the rise of a more somatically based model of psychiatric disorders, the patient's body rather than his or her mind or environment became an increasingly important site of therapeutic intervention.
Black was a liberal progressive professional, guided by the ideals of efficiency, competitiveness, moral therapy, and commerce; she wanted to see handicrafts integrated into the market.