ethics

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ethics

 [eth´iks]
1. a branch of philosophy dealing with values pertaining to human conduct, considering the rightness and wrongness of actions and the goodness or badness of the motives and ends of such actions.
2. systematic rules or principles governing right conduct. Each practitioner, upon entering a profession, is invested with the responsibility to adhere to the standards of ethical practice and conduct set by the profession. adj., adj eth´ical.
applied ethics practical ethics.
descriptive ethics a type of nonnormative ethics that simply reports what people believe, how they reason, and how they act.
medical ethics the values and guidelines governing decisions in medical practice.
nonnormative ethics ethics whose objective is to establish what factually or conceptually is the case, not what ethically ought to be the case. Two types are descriptive ethics and metaethics.
normative ethics an approach to ethics that works from standards of right or good action. There are three types of normative theories: virtue theories, deontological theories, and teleological theories.
nursing ethics the values and ethical principles governing nursing practice, conduct, and relationships. The Code for Nurses, adopted by the American Nurses' Association (ANA) in 1950 and revised periodically, is intended to provide definite standards of practice and conduct that are essential to the ethical discharge of the nurse's responsibility. Further information on the Code, interpretative statements that clarify it, and guidance in implementing it in specific situations can be obtained from committees and councils on nursing practice of State Nurses' Associations or from the ANA Nursing Practice Department.
practical ethics the attempt to work out the implications of general theories for specific forms of conduct and moral judgment; formerly called applied ethics.
professional ethics the ethical norms, values, and principles that guide a profession and the ethics of decisions made within the profession.

eth·ics

(eth'iks),
The branch of philosophy that deals with the distinction between right and wrong, with the moral consequences of human actions.
[G. ethikos, arising from custom, fr. ethos, custom]

ethics

(1) The study of fundamental principles which define values and determine moral duties and obligations.
 
(2) Moral codes of practice concerned with: behaviour (moral conduct)—e. g. unprofessional behaviour, such as direct discrimination; legal, religious, social and personal concerns (moral issues); and debates within society—e.g. euthanasia vs. prolonging the life of a terminally-ill person.

eth·ics

(eth'iks)
1. The branch of philosophy that deals with the distinction between right and wrong, with the moral consequences of human actions.
2. nursing Philosophy or code about what is ideal in human character and conduct; principles of right or wrong accepted by individual or group; study of morals and moral choices.
[G. ethikos, arising from custom, fr. ethos, custom]

eth·ics

(eth'iks)
The branch of philosophy that deals with the distinction between right and wrong and with the moral consequences of human actions.
[G. ethikos, arising from custom, fr. ethos, custom]

Patient discussion about ethics

Q. The cobbler's shoes are never fixed A bit philosophical/ethical question: do you think it’s a appropriate to an alternative therapist to treat people with disease he or she has and can’t cure himself?

A. Even dietitian can suffer from depression and eat too much, or a gym coach that suffers from injury that prevents him or her from exercising. The knowledge and capabilities are not dependent on the specific situation of the therapist, not to mention the many explanations for such cases.

However, I do agree it may seem a bit suspicious…

More discussions about ethics
References in periodicals archive ?
Apart from weak-willed actions and actions from impure motives, we can also act more or less violently and aggressively for the sake of our own personal interests, and directly against the freedom of any others to set and pursue their own freely chosen ends (see Kant, 1998: 30), which means that we let the principle of self-love override the moral law, without pretending that it is otherwise.
Most societies recognize their moral law as stemming at least in part from religious authority, (65) and much of the Western world's moral codes comes from the Hebrew Bible and Judeo-Christian teachings.
(47) For example, "treating people with respect is good" serves as a major premise, which, along with a minor premise such as "telling the truth is respectful," grounds the judgment "telling the truth is good." In the third case, practical principles, such as the moral law or the principle of happiness, guide deliberation about the premises we employ in practical reasoning.
To be governing, then, moral laws must employ a sufficiently robust notion of moral necessity, where the fulfillment of some (usually non-moral) universal necessitates a particular agential response.
Even more unfortunately, the media (including some Catholic media) have given the impression that moral laws are the outcome of "public opinion polls." Thus, a few Bishops' Conferences have made public the results of the surveys which they have conducted on issues like "live-in" (or de facto) relationships, on contraception and on the question of divorced and re-married Catholics being admitted to receive the Eucharist.
Murphy pays particular attention in this chapter to how "detachable" (in John Finnis's terms) natural-law theory is from an explicitly theistic ethic, altering Murphy's previously held position in Natural Law and Practical Rationality that there is no necessary and immediate theistic explanation of the natural moral law. This is a somewhat novel position for a contemporary natural-law theorist-- though (ironically) it has similarities with the stance of the traditionalist Thomist Steven A.
Philosophers have long struggled with understanding how it is possible to reconcile Kant's adamant claim that humans are genuinely free only when they act from the moral law of reason with his claims that humans are on another level free to choose actions that are immoral or that have no moral import at all.
This brings us back to Kant's other object of reverence and awe, the moral law within.
This brings us back to Kant's other object of reverence and awe, the moral law within.Aa What would beings with a completely different evolutionary origin from us -- perhaps not even carbon-based life forms -- think of our moral law?
Categorical imperatives, simply put, consist of "doing the right thing," or a form of moral law. In Kant's construct, humans' natural instinct is to act in a moral or "good" way; if all humans follow their instincts for goodness, their actions could lead to an absolute, universal moral law.
On such a reading, the experience of the beautiful holds less of a constitutive role in moral motivation in given situations (such as the role an inclination to love others would hold in an interpersonal situation), and more of a general motivational push toward cultivating one's ability to will from the moral law through disinterested, rational activity.
Natural theology, Barth argued, meant humanity possessed an inherent natural capacity to receive soteriologically weighted revelation, not merely the natural knowledge of God's eternal power and divine nature that nullifies every possible excuse for breaking the moral law. The movement aimed at diminishing natural law, natural rights, and natural theology signaled a shift from viewing the natural knowledge of God as a hallmark of orthodoxy to a harbinger of modernism.