Concerns arise because of the role taken by MOFE in interpreting laws and supervisory regulations, giving the FSC, FSS, and SFC only limited freedom in implementing supervision.
These obviously include MOFE's presumptive role in interpreting laws and regulations, frequent staff rotation between FSC and MOFE, and the rapid turnover of FSC chairmanship, which are symptomatic of the informal institutions that underlie the bureaucratic system of the Korean government in general and MOFE in particular.
To prevent an impending crisis MOFE, FSC/FSS, and BOK intervened, taking the lead in arranging rescue plans and forcing credit card companies to abide by hastily drawn-up restructuring packages.
29) The following discussion, based on a detailed examination of the relevant documents and data published by MOFE, FSC/FSS, and BOK during the period 1999-2003, reports how these public agencies failed in their role as supervisory agencies.
MOFE began undertaking a series of deregulatory measures for credit card companies in 1997-1999.
34) These and other actions taken by MOFE to stimulate real estate investment in mid-1998 were probably warranted at that time, when the Korean economy was experiencing a credit crunch and a high rate of unemployment as a result of the crisis.
I cannot help but sympathize with my colleagues and staff at MOFE when I am reminded of your dedication despite difficulties.
Calling on MOFE for change and innovation is the order of the day.
We must keep asking ourselves on the role and function of MOFE and reflect ourselves with a stricter yardstick.
First, we should strive to keep MOFE as a key player in formulation of the national economic policy.
Criticisms on MOFE have largely been attributable to weak governance.
I urge you to make MOFE play the role of Grand Designer in its full sense presenting people with the vision for the Korean economy and leading agenda-setting.