M'Naghten rule

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M'Naghten rule

 [mik-naw´ton]
a definition of criminal responsibility formulated in 1843 by English judges questioned by the House of Lords as a result of the acquittal of Daniel M' Naghten on grounds of insanity. It holds that “to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, he did not know he was doing what was wrong” and further that a defendant who “labors under partial delusions only and is not in other respects insane… must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.” These rules are still used in many American jurisdictions.

M'Nagh·ten rule

(mik-naw'tĕn),
the classic English test of criminal responsibility (1843): "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reasoning, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

M'Nagh·ten rule

(mik-naw'tĕn rūl)
The classic English test of criminal responsibility (1843): "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reasoning, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

M'Naghten,

Daniel, English criminal, tried in March, 1843.
M'Naghten rule - the classic English test of criminal responsibility.
References in periodicals archive ?
(1978); Daniel Ward, The M'Naghten Rule: A Re-Evaluation, 45 Marq.
In 1962, the American Law Institute published the Model Penal Code, which combined the strictly cognitive M'Naghten rules and the irresistible impulse test.
Montana, Utah and Idaho abolished the insanity defense altogether; other states adopted the more stringent M'Naghten rules over the Model Penal Code definition of insanity; several states shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense; and 14 states offered an alternative to NGRI, which is the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
The M'Naghten Rules were formulated by I5 judges of the Queen's Bench in response to five questions put to them by the House of Lords when they were called to appear to defend the controversial M'Naghten decision.
The M'Naghten Rules, with their focus on delusions understood as wrong beliefs, clearly reflected contemporary psychiatric preoccupations, but transformed the psychiatric foci into distinctly legal constructs widely perceived by psychiatrists to be at odds with the fundamentals of psychiatric understanding (see Teubner, 1989:748-9; see also Forshaw and Rollin 1990:75-101).
delusion" part of the M'Naghten rules, so the integrationist
Clark argued that the full M'Naghten rule was the minimum test
M'Naghten rule is not a fundamental principle of justice subsumed
The prominent alienist Henry Maudsley dismissed the rules as "confused" and "a false inference founded on insufficient observation" of insanity, and declared "they are unanimously condemned by all physicians who have a practical knowledge of the insane."(16) Not only did the M'Naghten Rules inspire debate between and within the legal and medical professions, but they fell far short of eliminating public doubt about the legitimacy of the insanity acquittal.
Was it a case of juries inflexibly adhering to the M'Naghten Rules when dealing with male defendants, and assessing female defendants more subjectively?
Thus, from the public and Queen's reaction in 1843, the common law judges created the M'Naghten rules. (117) The M'Naghten rules require that an individual must clearly prove that "at the time of the committing of the act," he or she was "labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act" he or she was committing, and if he or she was aware, he or she "did not know" that the act was wrong.
(122) Therefore, under the stricter M'Naghten rules, M'Naghten himself would most likely "be judged sane and legally culpable by the standards of the rules which bear his name." (123)