validity

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validity

 [vah-lid´ĭ-te]
the extent to which a measuring device measures what it intends or purports to measure.
construct validity the degree to which an instrument measures the characteristic being investigated; the extent to which the conceptual definitions match the operational definitions.
content validity verification that the method of measurement actually measures what it is expected to measure; see also face validity.
external validity the extent to which study findings can be generalized beyond the sample used in the study.
face validity a type of content validity, determining the suitability of a given instrument as a source of data on the subject under investigation, using common-sense criteria.
internal validity the extent to which the effects detected in a study are truly caused by the treatment or exposure in the study sample, rather than being due to other biasing effects of extraneous variables.
predictive validity the effectiveness of one set of test or research results as a predictor of the outcome of future experiments or tests.

va·lid·i·ty

(vă-lid'i-tē),
An index of how well a test or procedure in fact measures what it purports to measure; an objective index by which to describe how valid a test or procedure is.

methodological quality

The extent to which the design and conduct of a trial are likely to have prevented systematic errors (bias). Variation in quality can explain variation on the results of trials included in a systematic review. Rigourously designed (better quality) trials are more likely to yield results that are closer to the “truth” (i.e., unbiased).

va·lid·i·ty

(vă-lid'i-tē)
Truthfulness; the ability of a test to measure correctly as intended.

validity 

The extent to which a measurement correctly measures what it is supposed to measure or to which extent the findings of an investigation reflect the truth. In health sciences, validity is commonly assessed by determining the sensitivity and specificity factors. See reliability; sensitivity; specificity.

va·lid·i·ty

(vă-lid'i-tē)
Index of how well a test or procedure in fact measures what it purports to measure; an objective index by which to describe how valid a test or procedure is.
References in periodicals archive ?
Since (Two) is a logical consequence of 0 [not equal to] 0, then according to our logicist (Two) is itself analytic and logically true, provided that analyticity and logical truth are closed under logical consequence, or at least the introduction rule for the first-order existential quantifier.
The first difficulty for this approach concerns the significance of things labelled "logical truths".
The set of philosophical views which reject both skepticism and naturalism about logical truth (i.e., which hold that we can attain knowledge of logical truths, and that this knowledge does exhibit this aforementioned immunity to counterexample) is vast and varied.
So he must have thought that there are more basic logical truths than are needed to derive and justify all the (non-basic) truths of logic and arithmetic.
Now what, on Russell's approach, would the AT-expression "is a logical truth" mean--how is that expression to be understood?
I was particularly taken by his insistence that the remarks about facts at the beginning of the Tractatus are 'meant to be read in a way that is as vacuous as possible' (26), his explanation of Wittgenstein's argument that picturing the world presupposes the existence of simple objects (38-44), his discussion of the requirement that sense be determinate (54-60), his examination of the all-important Tractarian idea of propositions as pictures (68-74), his survey of Wittgenstein's remarks about generating all (meaningful) propositions from elementary propositions by means of a single truth-operator (83-98), and his analysis of how Wittgenstein's view of logical truth does--and does not--fall foul of the undecidability of predicate logic (106-08).
of logical truths.(36) (Carried back over to the discussion of facts, both would show only that all logical truths stand for the same fact.) Thus Godel's slingshot would demonstrate something of mild interest: if 8 is +PSST and +[iota]-CONV then it also permits the substitution s.v.
In fact we shall later prove (Theorem 2.4) that [Delta]X is always either [Phi] (representing logical falsity) or [Delta]X is W (representing logical truth), o else [Delta]X represents a sentence which can be formed from propositional symbols [p.sub.i] by employing only conjunction and disjunction--the classical syntactic definition of a 'positive' sentence (c.f.
A necessarily true sentence is brute if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one.
In an exceptionally clear rendering of Kant's thought, she places the ground of logical truth in the discursive intellect, i.e.
Theories of Meaning and Logical Truth: Edwards versus Davidson, MIGUEL HOELTJE
Should the models considered for evaluating logical truth in higher-order logic be confined to standard ones?