wrongful death

(redirected from Immunity from Suit)
Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Legal, Financial.
Related to Immunity from Suit: Governmental immunity
Death caused by negligence or other wrongful act

wrongful

Forensic medicine An adjective with considerable medico-legal currency, used in several contexts. See Negligence.
Wrongful
Wrongful death An event that is usually regarded as negligent. See Negligence.
 Wrongful birth An event resulting from the failure of a contraceptive or sterilization procedure, eg fallopian tube liagation, failure to diagnose pregnancy, or an unsuccessful attempt to abort a conceptus.
Wrongful life An event in which legal action may be taken by–or on behalf of the baby suffering from a hereditary or congenital defect, eg Down syndrome or other disease, eg rubella, who would not have been born had the parents had the knowledge to opt for an abortion; WL represents either the failure to diagnose in utero a condition that would lead to a major life-long handicap or recognize such a condition in a sibling, allowing a 2º, similarly afflicted, child to be born; the child is the defendant named in a lawsuit initiated to defray the incurred and anticipated medical, nursing and related health expenses; in both WB and WL, the defendant may be liable for support and care of the infant from 'cradle to grave'

wrongful death

Loss of life caused by negligent, illegitimate, or illegal acts.
See also: death
References in periodicals archive ?
has already waived its immunity from suit. Under my proposed rule, a
tribe and enjoys the tribe's immunity from suit. (31) Whether a
The concern subsequently arose when it was realized that the Constitution failed to embrace recognition of State sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.
On its face, s 78 authorises the Commonwealth Parliament to remove the Commonwealth and the states' immunity from suit for cases in federal jurisdiction.
The issue of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court is older than the Constitution itself: it arose during debates over the Constitution's ratification, when opponents of ratification drew attention to the provision, in Article III, for federal jurisdiction over suits "between a State and Citizens of another State." (15) This provision, Anti-Federalists observed, appeared to apply just as much to suits in which a state is a defendant as to suits in which a state is a plaintiff.
Mississippi,(71) for example, the Court addressed the question of whether a state maintains sovereign immunity from suits by a foreign nation.(72) The Court said yes, proclaiming broadly that states maintained their immunity from suit without specific consent "save where there has been `a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.'"(73) This reasoning implicitly presumes that the default immunity applies to all unconsented suits, not just to suits by private individuals as had sometimes been asserted previously.
The Court held that local government officials enjoy absolute immunity from suit for their legislative acts, just as surely as if they had been state legislators.
158 (1992), which assessed whether private defendants who had been charged with a violation of constitutional rights were entitled to assert qualified immunity from suit. The most salient points of the Wyatt decision for the purpose of the majority in Richardson v.
Jennifer Coleman, a Buffalo, N.Y., attorney, testified, "Indian governments have been permitted by Congress to claim a degree of sovereign immunity from suit that grossly exceeds that of state or federal governments and that defies the rights of non-Indians affected by the acts of Indian governments."
The Court reasoned that the county's assertion that the sheriff is not a policymaker does not rank as an immunity from suit. Instead, it acts as a mere defense to liability that can be reviewed effectively on appeal after a final judgment.
Much of Wilson's lengthy opinion focused on the nature of state sovereignty and the extent of any sovereign immunity from suit. Later, Wilson sought to show that, at least in America, ultimate sovereignty resided in the people themselves.
Denying the claims of the defendants-former New York State Correction Commissioner Russell Oswald, former Superintendent Vincent Mancusi and former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Karl Pfeil-that they were entitled to immunity from suit, the three-judge panel held that such a defense did not apply to charges that the officials failed to plan for the inmates' medical needs after the retaking of the prison's D yard and that they condoned, tacitly or otherwise, bestial reprisals.