handicap principle

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handicap principle

A hypothesis that the extravagance of an animal’s mating displays proves individual strength, because animals with handicaps do not have the strength for mating dominance.

Example
Huge antlers for deer stags.

The cost or handicap is a virtual guarantee of the honesty of the display; if there were no cost to the display—e.g., proof of the stag’s superiority by fighting other males—there would be rampant cheating, and observers (other stags) would learn to ignore the “false” displays. Because antlers are costly, it would not be worthwhile for a weaker stag to produce large antlers and try to “bluff” his way into mating superiority.
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In costly signaling theory it is posited that human helping behavior functions as a costly signal to others: costly because of the associated time, money, or sacrifice spent in helping another person; and as a signal of elevated status based on resource possession, ability, or cooperative intent (Bereczkei et al.
Understanding the interplay of credentials and context could be useful in predicting future behavior: in line with competitive altruism and costly signaling theory, public context will generally attenuate selfish impulses and promote altruistic behavior when reputation is at stake.
Cooperation and commune longevity: A test of the costly signaling theory of religion.
In the field of human behavioral ecology, Costly Signaling Theory (CST) is often employed to explain the existence of seemingly "wasteful" behaviors such as hunting and distributing game widely among non-kin.
Two central implications of the costly signaling theory of reassurance are as follows.