Notice that whether the person acts freely or unfreely in Watson's account, as in Frankfurt's account, is completely independent of causal determinism
. Given a complete statement of the facts about the world at time x, and a complete statement of the laws of nature, it might be that at time x it was already determined that C would, or would not, have sex.
Rather, Jones's responsibility depends upon whether or not causal determinism
Essentially, the main reasons come down to: (1) Science shows that causal determinism
is true, and (2) Reflective common sense shows that causal determinism
The reactive attitudes are what anchor moral responsibility; since we have these attitudes, and since they cannot be threatened by causal determinism
, causal determinism
makes no difference one way or another to our status as responsible creatures.
Chapter 6, "The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism," appeals to examples of preemptive and simultaneous overdetermination (which resemble Frankfurt examples in some respects) to undermine Peter van Inwagen's direct argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism
. There is a wealth of detailed argument in each of these chapters.
Most of the traditional defenses for compatibilism center on the claim that free will (or autonomy) and causal determinism
in the explanation of human behavior or choices are logically or metaphysically compatible.
The fourth section of the book concentrates on the Stoic view on causal determinism
given that we cannot be certain that causal determinism
is false and
Finally, it deserves remark that the account of emergence presented here in no way presupposes general causal determinism
or its denial, and it thus implies the falsity of Karl Popper's contention that "the emergence of hierarchical levels or layers, and of an interaction between them, depends upon a fundamental indeterminism of the physical universe."(30) Believing that unpredictability is the principle criterion of emergence, Popper notes that a sufficient degree of physical indeterminacy could make certain actual evolutionary developments involving the appearance of complex biological systems exceedingly improbable on remote prior conditions, and so unpredictable in principle.
This omission is particularly surprising since Schleiermacher sketches an outline, at least implicitly, for a rather creative alternative to eighteenth-century causal determinism
The first is his handling of Kant's solution to the tension between the freedom of practical reasoning with the causal determinism
of the world in which human action occurs.
Given the compatibilist's intuition, the possible existence of breaks in causal determinism
is strictly beside the point.