[A] is true iff [F(A)) was true iff [P(A)] will be true, where the assumption is that in the second and third elements of the
biconditionals the tensed truth predicate succeeds in "cancelling" the tensed operator, in effect returning us to the statement made by the original sentence.
Can counterexamples like this be avoided by placing a different construal on the
biconditional? For reasons to be given in [section] VII, I regard this as an unpromising avenue to follow, especially when set alongside an alternative.
On such an account, which bears some analogies to my analysis of the Liar paradox (Koons 1992), the Tarski
biconditionals all come out as true:
Unless condition (ii) is met, the provisoed
biconditional will be insubstantial, and so will need no explanation.
Next, we might wonder whether the
biconditional formulation is appropriate here--whether not having to cross immigration checkpoints is a "discretionary benefit" for the purposes of the doctrine.
Biconditional behavior: Conditioning without constraint.
EXPERIMENT 2: DIRECTIONAL EFFECT ON CONDITIONAL AND
BICONDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Our assumption is that these conditionals are indeed semantically equivalent in the sense that both are usually interpreted as
biconditional (Espino et al., 2013; Montolio, 2000).
In brief, in this paper we are assuming that except if has a
biconditional meaning and that it describes exceptive possibility more precisely than the conditional unless.
uninterpretable features, the relevant connection between these being captured in the
biconditional in (c) immediately below:
Nor is the problem avoided if we water-down (K1) and (K2) to conditional rather than
biconditional or material equivalence formulations.
