holism

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ho·lism

(hō'lizm),
1. The principle that an organism, or one of its actions, is not equal to merely the sum of its parts but must be perceived or studied as a whole.
2. The approach to the study of a psychological phenomenon through the analysis of a phenomenon as a complete entity in itself. Compare: atomism.
[G. holos, entire]

holism

(hō′lĭz′əm)
n.
1. The theory that living matter or reality is made up of organic or unified wholes that are greater than the simple sum of their parts.
2. A holistic investigation or system of treatment.

ho′list n.

holism

Psychiatry An approach to the study of the individual in totality, rather than as an aggregate of separate physiologic, psychologic, and social characteristics

ho·lism

(hō'lizm)
1. Principle that an organism, or one of its actions, is not equal to merely the sum of its parts but must be perceived or studied as a whole.
2. The approach to the study of a psychological phenomenon through analysis as a complete entity in itself.
[G. holos, entire]
References in periodicals archive ?
If we replace the two occurrences of "corporation" (in this last sentence) with "group," we will get a general denial of the anti-reductionist approach that Dworkin represents.
Suppose instead that the anti-reductionist argues that a proposed reduction does not yield a mental state that is subject to the normative constraints that govern intentions.
Traditionally the dispute between reductionists and anti-reductionists has been about whether mental concepts are analyzable in terms of non-mental concepts.
It doesn't follow from this anti-reductionist approach, however, that one cannot make intelligible statements about issues within knowledge, but only that what can be said 'will itself ineliminably employ the concept of knowledge, and not in a merely preparatory fashion prior to a definition or elimination of knowledge' (73).
He is determinedly anti-reductionist. And what's wrong with that?
For whether this anti-reductionist block amounts to more than a case of stone-walling seems an open question.
Nevertheless, Hanna provides a new anti-reductionist argument, the discussion of which might shed light on some modal issues involved in the debate.
The third lecture outlines Grice's anti-reductionist "constructivist" case for the legitimacy of the notion of absolute value.
His conclusion that it is not depends upon some powerful and eloquently expressed anti-reductionist arguments that echo themes of an earlier essay not reprinted in this book.

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