sensible

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sensible

 [sen´sĭ-bl]
perceptible to the senses; capable of sensation.

sen·si·ble

(sen'si-bĕl),
1. Perceptible to the senses.
2. Capable of sensation.
3. Synonym(s): sensitive
4. Having reason or judgment; intelligent.
[L. sensibilis, fr. sentio, to feel, perceive]

sensible

/sen·si·ble/ (sen´sĭ-b'l)
1. capable of sensation.
2. perceptible to the senses.

sensible

(sĕn′sə-bəl)
adj.
1. Perceptible by the senses or by the mind.
2. Having the faculty of sensation; able to feel or perceive.
3. Having a perception of something; cognizant.

sensible

[sen′sibəl]
1 capable of sensation.
2 possessing reason or judgment.
3 capable of being perceived.

sen·si·ble

(sen'si-bĕl)
1. Perceptible to the senses.
2. Capable of sensation.
3. Synonym(s): sensitive.
4. Having reason or judgment; intelligent.
[L. sensibilis, fr. sentio, to feel, perceive]

sensible

perceptible to the senses; capable of sensation.
References in periodicals archive ?
An important question remains: In what sense are mathematical objects 'incomplete', and in what sense are sensible objects 'complete?
As for the second objection: Annas argues that sensible objects are not composed of lines and planes in the same way that mathematical objects are.
This objection rests on the assumption that because it is true that sensible bodies are different from mathematical solids, the Platonists would not treat them like mathematical solids and, hence, would not say that they are composed of lines and planes in the way the former are.
Regardless of Plato's intention in this text, his discussion clearly and explicitly involves the construction of sensible bodies from planes.
Thus, it is likely that when Aristotle discusses the generation of sensible bodies from lines and planes in our two M 2 arguments, he has the Timaeus in mind.
Whether or not Aristotle does, in fact, recognize that sensible bodies cannot be constructed from lines and planes in the way that mathematical solids can, we might still ask why he uses this false premise in his argument.
Thus when, in our two arguments, Aristotle says that lines and planes are prior in generation to sensible objects, we should not take him to be assuming this to be true.
Aristotle himself does not believe that natural, sensible objects come to be from points, lines, and planes.
One might still object that Aristotle's arguments only show that sensible objects are prior in ousia to planes and lines, and not that they are prior in this way to all mathematical objects.
The worry is that this characterization is dependent upon Aristotle's own view of substance, according to which living, sensible beings comprise what are actually 'real' (i.