The distinction between first and second intentions is perhaps best clarified by way of example.
This central claim, repeated throughout the treatise, is the basis for many of Hervaeus's positions concerning second intentions.
144-7); logic, on the other hand, is described as dealing with entia rationis or second intentions and a logical understanding of the categories consists in understanding ontological categories as subject to second intentions (p.
By contrast, Scotus attempts to buttress Aquinas's contention that second intentions are concepts of concepts by insisting that second intentions are not based on the quidditative being of things but upon their esse cognitum, their being understood, and the relations represented by second intentional concepts such as "genus" and "species" have their immediate foundation in the ways we understand things rather than the ways that things are (pp.
The term "animal" is significative because all second intentions depend upon first intentions for their intelligible content.
By way of contrast, second intentions exist as mutual (rational) relations between what is "known" and further logical attributions.
To fully appreciate Poinsot's insight on this point it is perhaps best to note how representative being differs in first and second intention.
The difference between first and second intention was generally misunderstood by epistemologists of the early modem period.