By procreating we determine the initial full quantum of legal and moral relations for a member of a class of persons.
With these concepts of the broad right to procreate, the class of prospective children, and property in others in mind, as well as the premise that procreating allows prospective parents to create future relations for prospective children, we can assess whether under the broad right these children are treated as property.
By deciding where and when to pluck them out of the class by procreating, the prospective parent or parents alone will decide--in the process of excluding others and the constructive interests of members of that class--what these persons shall have as their initial birthrights.
Or as I have argued here, because of the unique nature of the act of procreating, the liberty and privacy-based right we extend to prospective parents is converted into a property right in members of the class of their prospective children.
When, if at all, does the value of procreating become sated?
339) Nor does common experience of the reasons persons give for procreating always comport with the notion of an act of "great significance for personal identity," or a "serious" act in Griffin's sense.
In her dissent in Oakley, Justice Sykes opined that Oakley should not be required to show financial means to support his existing and future children before procreating again because lesser restrictions, such as jail time with work release for mandatory employment, were available.
If the intrinsic value of procreating is the self-fulfillment of the procreator (Skinner's "right to have offspring"), then we can presume this experiential value, this fulfillment, is achieved after the first birth- and merely replicated thereafter.
Finally, let us again assume that each act of procreating is serious, and now that it carries intrinsic value that is not capable of fulfillment, but may potentially be experienced ad infinitum.
362) Not procreating is personal; procreating is interpersonal.
375) However, both of these arguments have been convincingly rejected, for example by Elizabeth Harman whose "person affecting" theory of harm to future persons provides compelling moral reasons to consider the interests of prospective children when procreating.