The criterion of choice in originative decisions is direct preference for one set of consequences in comparison with the consequences of other courses of action.
On the other hand, in an originative decision, courses of action are compared with each other, so there must always be at least two courses.
Here's how the originative pattern works in very simple cases.
If we never made decisions in the originative pattern, it would be difficult to explain how we're able to decide among courses of action that involve consequences not previously contemplated and not covered by the goals we've selected earlier.
This line of argument can become involved and cannot in any event establish the existence of an originative pattern of decision making.
In the originative pattern, examination of the facts comes first, and a value judgment (direct preference) comes second.
Again, I'd like to add a few more short comments instead of going into more detail on the originative pattern.
The purely originative pattern is not very frequently used in making administrative decisions (although large scale decisions are partly goal-directed and partly originative, they fall on the continuum but not at either extreme).
And even if human behavior were partially attributable to some random element, that would do nothing to endow us with originative agenthood.
Our concept of moral responsibility need not rest on the myth of originative agency but only on the necessity for social order.