occurrence

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oc·cur·rence

(ŏ-kŭr'ĕns)
Any event or incident.

occurrence

in epidemiological terms means frequency of a disease without defining incidence or prevalence.

Patient discussion about occurrence

Q. In the meanwhile can someone give any hints if this sounds like diabetes or is a natural occurrence? My husband and I are diabetic. My daughter is pregnant and has been fine so far. My daughter says that fluids are good for her and she drinks a lot of water. She also keeps snacking on a bag of toffees. Every day I see the same ritual. She says she is always hungry. She has a craving to eat anything that is sweet. I suspect that there is something wrong her. In the meanwhile can someone give any hints if this sounds like diabetes or is a natural occurrence?

A. One thing I learned from my doctor is that the body will attempt to eliminate high blood sugar by making you urinate more frequently. This is what makes you thirsty when your blood glucose is high, making you want to drink more and more. It causes the dry mouth in the morning when you wake up. This is what I was experiencing with my diabetic condition before I was diagnosed. I am an insulin resistsnt (type II) diabetic.

Thirst is just one symptom.

Getting an A1c test will determine if there is diabetes. You have to see a doctor for that and the results are usually irrefutable.

Eating sugar candy will raise the blood glucose level. This would be dangerous for a diabetic.

Tell the tohe doctor and get her tested or evaluated and then you will know the real medical condition. All any of us can do on a forum like this is share experiences and info we learn. Nothing anyone suggests can substitute for what a doctor can easily determine for something like this with a blood test.

More discussions about occurrence
References in periodicals archive ?
In 'Reflections on Two Kinds of Consciousness', Burge reaffirms his claim that phenomenal consciousness is basic, while rational-access consciousness is an occurrent condition.
5) (Disjunctive syllogism) It follows that there must be a fully actualized state (identified by Aristotle as nous poietikos) that is "in the soul" (en tei psuchei) and causes the fully actualized, occurrent knowing of a human knower.
That is, the conclusion may seem to suggest that the knowledge (in the dispositional sense) that is gained by the knowing subject by his interaction with the natural world (as described, for example, in the Posterior Analytics) and that is subsequently rendered occurrent in the actual thinking of the knowing subject somehow already preexists in full actuality in that knowing subject.
One strategy is to distance nous poietikos (which is identified with fully actualized, occurrent knowledge/knowing) from the individual knowing subject in such a way that, while it is a knowing intellect (nous poietikos) that is the cause of the occurrent knowing of the human knower, the human knower is not already somehow in possession of the knowledge the acquisition of which Aristotle sets out to explain.
5, as pertaining to the transition from possession of knowledge in this dispositional sense to knowing in the fullest actual, occurrent sense.
My second premise is the causal principle: The preceding hexis of passive or receptive intellective psuche must be brought to full occurrent actualization (energeia, second entelechy) by something that already possesses this full actuality.
Although Aristotle certainly seems to invoke such a principle in his account of the transformation of dispositional knowledge into its fully actualized, occurrent state, it is hot clear exactly where his principle fits in the continuum between very concrete and very abstract forms of the causal principle.
Among the many problems with this famous text is the difficulty of deciding whether nous poietikos, interpreted as the causal agent that transforms dispositional knowledge into actual, occurrent knowing, is itself an energeia in the sense of an occurrent state of knowing.
The first sort of argument is psychological and begins with commonsensical reflection on a dissimilarity between sensing and knowing, both in their fully actualized, occurrent forms.
To be sure, a few words such as babish, bag-pudding, disswasive, and occurrents look somewhat uncharacteristic of Webster.
New York: AMS Press, 1966): babish (46); disswasive (5, 16); occurrents (17, 33, 34).
For a continuant we invoke special phases of occurrents in its life, vital occurrents, without whose occurrence it would not exist then.