falsificationism


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falsificationism

view, propounded by the philosopher Popper and coming to prominence in the English-speaking world in the 1950s, that the hallmark of good science is to challenge every hypothesis or theory ('conjecture') by actively identifying and testing predictions which follow only from it, not from competing theories, one criterion of a good theory being that it gives rise to many such explicit, unique and so 'vulnerable' predictions. Failure of the prediction will then falsify or refute the theory; on the other hand, success of a prediction can be regarded as corroborating evidence but not as irrefutable proof, which is never possible. aka refutationism ; contrasts with verificationism.
References in periodicals archive ?
In second section I discuss the main feature of Popper's methodology of falsificationism and his claim of tolerant society.
Therefore I think that Bartley's version of critical rationalism is only a natural expansion or clarification of Popper's nonjustificational falsificationism (fallibilism).
About the "poverty" of the Popperian falsificationism see Barbagallo (1995), 55-60.
In an important sense, this position resembles both Kuhn's (1996) and that of sophisticated falsificationism.
Falsificationism is a rejoinder to ambitions of verifiability: the notion that a scientific theory can ever be considered "confirmed.
The philosophical school originated in the works of the Austrian-English philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994), namely critical rationalism or falsificationism, states that scientific hypotheses or theories are characterized by being falsifiable, and that evolutionary theory would not be scientific since it is incapable of providing bold, risky predictions (Popper, 1985).
Falsificationism therefore requires that theories should be formulated clearly enough to run the risk of being refuted.
Widely held views about how academic criticism should be conducted, as set forth by willful proponents of skepticism, falsificationism, or deconstructionism, are subtly at variance with the realities of spontaneous human inquiry as disclosed by sustained self-appropriation.
He clearly explains how science works, covering standard topics like deduction, induction, the role of observation and experiment, reductionism, and falsificationism, as well as such cutting-edge and oft-neglected issues as Bayesian statistics, myths about science, and the limits of science.
The limitations of both naive inductivism and naive falsificationism highlights the complexity of appraising theories.
Although remnants of the Pop perian view remain rightfully influential (in my opinion, these remnants would be his critical rationalism rather than his falsificationism and, for the social sciences, his situational analysis), I would say that by the end of the decade the program had pretty much run out of steam.