epistemology

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e·pis·te·mol·o·gy

(ĕ-pis'tĕ-mol'ŏ-jē),
The study of knowledge and rules of evidence involved. Traditionally a branch of philosophy, it also describes a discipline incorporated in, and in some respects peculiar to, individual fields of scholarship (medicine, science, history, etc.).

epistemology

The theory, study of, and basis for knowledge; that which investigates the origin, nature, methods, validity and limits of human knowledge.

epistemology (·pisˈ·t·mäˑ·l·jē),

n that branch of philosophy that scrutinizes the nature, foundations, and limits of knowledge.
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From the results of this investigation, the epistemologist will be equipped with the descriptions of the way human beings usually pursue knowledge, from which he will be able to sift the "norms" for pursuing knowledge.
Can we know we really have hands and are not just brains in vats, epistemologists have asked for some time.
In short, "[a]n implicit agreement seems to have been made to let the sociologists concern themselves only with what actually passes as knowledge in particular cases, while the epistemologists take care of what ought to pass as knowledge in general" (Fuller, 1988, p.
Many epistemologists today think there is an intimate connection between assertion and knowledge.
This is the question that epistemologists of economics such as Rosenberg, Sen, Blaug, Hausman, Wong, Maki, Mirowski, et al.
Instead, the overriding focus of epistemologists over the centuries has been, first, to describe the epistemic ideal that human beings might hope to achieve, and then go on to chart the various ways in which we ordinarily fall off from that ideal.
Alvin Goldman, in 'Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism', considers the puzzles raised by the foundationalist notion of immediate or direct justification, critically examines the solutions offered by some epistemologists who propose internalist accounts of justification, and argues that his own version of reliabilism (i.
Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S's true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S's belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe.
That we are asking these questions now, in the face of resistance by traditional epistemologists, is a consequence of many factors, the editors argue, among which are: debates concerning the justification condition of the tripartite definition of knowledge; the shift to examining epistemic activities rather than static concepts or states; interest in the properties of epistemic agents among virtue epistemologists, social epistemologists and feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science; the post-Quinian naturalization of epistemology; and renewed interest in the philosophy of emotion generally.
At first glance, the empirical picture one gets from psychology appears to show that contemporary epistemologists are gravely mistaken about testimony.
Many epistemologists are attracted to the claim that knowledge possession excludes luck.
Non-skeptical epistemologists do have to answer these questions.