10) Hard determinism resembles fatalism, but differs from it in one crucial respect.
Goodman ("Resentment") rightfully disagrees with the equation of hard determinism and fatalism, because fatalism is acausal, as I noted earlier.
Although it is true that Frankfurt is much more well known for his article rejecting hard determinism ("Alternate") than he is for his article sketching his own model of the implied default (compatibilist) position thereafter ("Freedom"), it is, to my lights, a major oversight that few scholars have taken seriously his identification of the relative importance of freedom of the will versus the relative unimportance of freedom of action, as even my few remarks about this distinction here seem to amply illustrate.
In the next article in this series, "Determinism", I discuss how Charles Goodman embraces hard determinism, arguing that Buddhism rejects autonomous agency because it rejects agency or selfhood and because it rejects moral responsibility, which latter presupposes an autonomous self.
53) Siderits says he does not think this is an argument for hard determinism, but that what Santideva develops in the subsequent verses is an argument for the conclusion that responsibility-entailing freedom cannot exist at the ultimate level; Siderits thinks that hard determinism would follow from this only if you were an eliminativist about persons, whereas the Reductionist is not an eliminativist.
I grant Goodman's arguments for Buddhist determinism, arguendo, but I dispute his arguments for Buddhist hard determinism.
Goodman rejects Siderits's claim that early Buddhists were compatibilists on the grounds that what the early Buddhists rejected was fatalism: because fatalism is not hard determinism, early Buddhists did not reject hard determinism (Consequences 152-153).
The debate between hard and soft interpretations of determinism is not going to be resolved here, and I do not intend my criticisms to be proofs against hard determinism.
But the force of my objections was not directed at showing that these ideas were inconsistent with hard determinism, but rather at assessing the individual plausibility of various elements or their collective coherence.
However, I think either thesis 1 begs the question insofar as it equates determinism with hard determinism or else the inference from thesis 1 to thesis 2 is invalid, as soft determinists accept thesis 1 but doubt thesis
Thus, regardless of whether determinism and dependent origination are identical, it seems sufficiently clear that the Buddha would reject hard determinism.
Whereas hard and soft determinists agree with the karmavadins that actions have effects, hard determinism suggests that because there are no alternatives, actions are inevitable.