155) Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that the noninternational armed conflict and the law it invokes--Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, custom, domestic law, and Additional Geneva Protocol II--extend to terrorist groups located in Yemen, including AQAP.
Both Common Article 3 and Additional Geneva Protocol II permit a combatant in a noninternational armed conflict (here the United States) to engage and kill the enemy (here Al Qaeda and AQAP) so long as the use of force complies with broader principles of jus in bello.
3 [hereinafter Additional Geneva Protocol I] (outlining when civilian immunity applies).
609 [hereinafter Additional Geneva Protocol II] (stating treaty applies to noninternational conflicts); Geneva Convention III, supra note 29, art.
See Koh, supra note 80 (resolving to abide by Additional Geneva Protocol II thereby implying existence of noninternational armed conflict).
Recently, in 1999, the international community harmonized the 1954 Hague Convention with many of the customary international law principles in the Geneva Protocols.
Although the United States currently adheres to many of the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention and Geneva Protocols in practice, it still reserves the right to depart from un-ratified, international conventions when American interests collide with international, national, community, or private interests in cultural property.
The first step, perhaps, in showing that the United States has a renewed commitment to the cultural heritage of the world should be passage of the 1954 Hague Convention and the Geneva Protocols.
By contrast, the Operational Law Handbook from 2002 explicitly rejected Articles 55 and 56 of the Geneva Protocols because they afford protection to cultural sites even if they contain enemy forces and such a bright-line determination might actually encourage combatants to use cultural sites as shields.
See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 14 (quoting the Geneva Protocols, supra note 15, art.