Frye Rule

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A ruling by a Federal Court of Appeals (United States v. Frye, 293 F 1013—DC Cir 1923) in a criminal case in which the defendant sought to present evidence that a crude, scientifically invalid and unaccepted test showed that he was telling the truth. That court said, ‘...abandonment of the general acceptance requirement could result in a free-for-all in which befuddled juries would be confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions’
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The numerous tests and numerous conclusions accepted in courts without the Frye test shows that people are not being found on the larger scale for purposes of the SVPA.
Our specific adoption of that test after the enactment of the evidence code manifests our intent to use the Frye test as the proper standard for admitting novel scientific evidence in Florida, even though the Frye test is not set forth in the evidence code.
Appeals established a new rule of evidence: the Frye test.
Prior to Daubert, Florida courts analyzed the admissibility of expert witness testimony under the Frye test, which required that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
63) The Frye test only applies to scientific expertise and requires the trial judge to find that the expert testimony is based on a scientific principle that has gained "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
35) The Frye test is not concerned with the expert's opinions, but with the methodology used to support those opinions.
24) Though the Frye test appeared to require only a single, simple level of inquiry--that of determining "general acceptance"--in reality, the test required multiple steps of evaluation, each fraught with its own difficulties.
2006) ("[T]he Frye test asks 'whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.
So long as the expert employed methods that were sanctioned by other experts in the field, the Frye Test could be satisfied.
In the years after Frye, "sharp divisions" developed among the circuits about the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony, with some courts applying the Frye test and others rejecting it.
The Frye "general acceptance" standard remained the test for admitting forensic or scientific evidence until the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which conflicted with the Frye test.
The important Daubert decision is discussed only in the epilogue, and only in relation to its consequences for the Frye test.