epistemology

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Related to Epistemic justification: epistemology

e·pis·te·mol·o·gy

(ĕ-pis'tĕ-mol'ŏ-jē),
The study of knowledge and rules of evidence involved. Traditionally a branch of philosophy, it also describes a discipline incorporated in, and in some respects peculiar to, individual fields of scholarship (medicine, science, history, etc.).

epistemology

The theory, study of, and basis for knowledge; that which investigates the origin, nature, methods, validity and limits of human knowledge.

epistemology (·pisˈ·t·mäˑ·l·jē),

n that branch of philosophy that scrutinizes the nature, foundations, and limits of knowledge.
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This will be important to keep in mind when we turn to the application of contextualism to the hearsay exclusion; the worry is not (just) that fact finders' subjective beliefs about knowledge are swayed by listening to hearsay, but that the objective standards of epistemic justification are being manipulated.
That much of the epistemic justifications for God's existence, his attributes, theodicy, free will, etc.
It is deeply plausible that for p to justify q just is for p to be a reason for q, and that epistemic justifications just are epistemic reasons, or that epistemic reasons are just epistemic justifications.
19] This theory of epistemic justification holds that a belief's justification depends upon the reliability of the cognitive process which produced the belief.
Among the topics are epistemic justification, disagreement in philosophy, whether his response to religious diversity is an overstated case, more suggestions for divine command theorists, and a theory of assertives.
The account of epistemic justification offered by nonfoundationalist philosophers can help to shed light on these issues.
The social-scientific literature shows that most voters do not meet even low standards of epistemic justification, and so they are bad voters on my theory.
One is that Quine's naturalistic epistemology is descriptive, not normative, and so fails to provide an account of epistemic justification.
To the latter, it presents a part of recent discussions in epistemic justification, especially the debate about foundationalism.
The author articulates and defends a principle governing enforcement rights in response to a nonculpable nonjust rights-intrusion (for example, wrongful bodily attack by someone who falsely, but with full epistemic justification, believes that he is acting permissibly).
Though Bergmann helps to clarify what views of epistemic justification count as internalist, and which ones don't, his own way of dividing up the territory is peculiar.
If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.