Implicit in the Diachronic personality's attachment to continuity of self (the self's persistence in time--look Ma, it's still me) there would seem to be a tendency to adopt a narrative mode of self-representation, just as implicit in the Episodic personality's commitment to a kind of punctuated-equilibrium conception of the self (the self lacks durability and persistence--not there yesterday, but here today and gone tomorrow--though a human being with the self's name will stay the course), there would seem to be a tendency to eschew Narrative discourse and to adopt a non-Narrative mode of self-representation (if any).
It turns out that just as there can be Diachronic and Episodic individuals, so there can be Diachronic and Episodic cultures, with "revenge cultures" being representative of the Diachronic way of life and "happy-go-lucky" cultures representative of the Episodic way of life (431).
We have already seen how Strawson has invited us to line up "same human being," "Diachronic self-experience," and "Narrative self-representation" on what I will call the Diachronic side of the ledger and "different selves," Episodic self-experience," and "non-Narrative self-representation" on the Episodic side.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that Strawson, the self-professed Episodic, is as fully aware of his persistent human being self as any Diachronic would be or as any conscious human being would be.
On his way to examining the constituents and value of Narrative, Strawson devotes several pages (435-38) to quoting and briefly commenting on passages written by expert commentators, such as Jean Paul Sartre, Oliver Sacks, Jerome Bruner, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and Daniel Dennett, who give clear expression to--and who, for the most part, endorse--the psychological and ethical theses, this impressive concurrence of view among such a diverse group of influential thinkers offering quiet testimony to the hegemonic authority of the Diachronic conception of the Narrative mode of self representation.
Speaking ex cathedra in ipse dixit mode, Strawson makes it crystal clear that he believes the Episodic is not only a viable alternative to the Diachronic mode of self-experience and self-representation but also a vastly superior one intellectually and ethically.
What is particularly striking about these lacunae is that Strawson's very system has on the Episodic side the non-Narrative component which stands as the bold alternative to the Diachronic Narrative component.
We are, then, both Diachronic and Episodic, evanescent and enduring, both other and the same, protean and persistent, and I see no reason to suppose that the "same human being" is anyone but our enduring "self" that continues to provide accommodations for many emergent "selves*.