Even if the developed country has jurisdiction, the protest, as an expression of strong countervailing foreign interests, may make its exercise unreasonable.
The developed country also has an interest in protecting competition in foreign markets.
Only where the developed country explicitly requests enforcement could the lack of jurisdiction be remedied through the principle of representation.
It would be hegemonialist, even neocolonialist, for a developed country to take over regulation of an underdeveloped country's markets.
Neocolonialism, like colonialism, depicts a situation in which a developed country exploits an underdeveloped country for its own benefit.
If the first problem was one in which the developed country inserts too much of its own interests into the supplanting, the opposite problem is that the developed country may have no such interest at all.
102) Indeed, her solution is in important ways similar to the concept of supplanting developed here: findings and decisions are made in the developed country and then applied to the developing country.
Another possible objection is that the antitrust law of a developed country might not be adequate for the regulation of developing economies because they need different antitrust regimes.
The argument in this article is not that the law of the developed country should be used for all antitrust regulation.