acrasia

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acrasia

An obsolete term for a lack of self-control; disinhibition.
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But as we noted, this seems unable to explain the experience of akrasia, or persistent temptation against one's better judgment.
Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon Santideva's Arguments with Himself"' Argumentation Vol.
For a reconstruction of the Chrysippean attempt to explain akrasia, see Joyce 1995, 315-335.
Third, intentionally self-frustrating behaviour, as may be exhibited in akrasia or psychopathology, is irrational because it violates the basic idea of rationality that one should choose suitable ways of achieving one's (overall) objectives.
Nor do we find that Aristotle restricts genuine deliberation to the few in, for example, Nicomachean Ethics VI where he reflects on it in relation to the specification of phronesis as practical deliberation implied by moral virtue nor, again, in Nicomachean Ethics VII in relation to akrasia and the ways in which we may fail to deliberate properly.
All of the above discussed theoretical and philosophical nuance, it must be kept in mind, is presented with discussions on Stoicism, ancient optical theories (intromission, extramission, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic), akrasia, sophrosyne, conscientia sui, the evil eye, the tactile qualities of seeing, ocular penetration, mythology, meteorological phenomena, scopic paradigms, shame and guilt cultures, the iconography of phallic symbolism, the status of the orator, the status of the actor, and virtus as background.
Accepting that would make akrasia and self-sacrifice conceptually impossible.
Akrasia in Greek philosophy; from Socrates to Plotinus.
20) George Ainslie has stressed that exponential discounting allows no such period, leaving akrasia a mystery.
Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT'L REV.
As the philosopher Harry Frankfurt has argued, the best way to understand the addict (following, among other things, Plato's analysis of akrasia, or weakness of the will) is that he has first-order desire which, at the second order, he does not desire: he wants the drug (or whatever) but does not want to want it.
Oddly, he begins the discussion by considering the analogy between the rich egalitarian, and the classical problem of akrasia, i.